INSURANCE PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: ADDRESSING MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND PROVIDING A VIEW FROM A DIFFERENT PARADIGM
JEFFREY E. THOMAS* T HE recent spectacular demise of American International Group (AIG), the world's largest insurer,' has raised issues about insurance regulation and its role in the financial crisis. As one who spends considerable time studying insurance law, I was very pleased to be invited to be part of this symposium. Although I feel a little like a "fish out of water" surrounded by securities and banking experts, I hope that my insurance perspective on federal regulatory reform will be useful.
I have subtitled this Article "Addressing Misunderstandings and Providing a View from a Different Paradigm" because I believe that much of the current call for federal regulatory reform of insurance is based on fundamental misunderstandings regarding AIG and the financial crisis, and because insurance, which is regulated predominately at the state level, provides a different, and potentially useful, regulatory paradigm. Part I of this Article analyzes the role of insurance in the financial crisis. It exposes the misunderstandings and explains how insurance had little, if any, role in the crisis. Part II outlines the current, state-based regulatory paradigm for insurance, and explains how this paradigm has become a barrier for federal reform in the insurance area. Finally, Part III addresses the powerful role played by the courts in insurance regulation, and suggests that financial regulatory reform could benefit from use of a similar model for other financial services.
I. INSURANCE WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE FINANCIAL CRisis
Although AIG is the largest and one of the strongest insurance companies in the world, 2 its collapse was not an insurance regulatory failure. Instead, AIG's collapse was caused by a non-insurance subsidiary's overinvestment in credit default swaps (CDS). While CDS are similar to insurance in certain respects, they were not insurance products and were not decline in the value of the securities backed by the AIG CDS. 12 This decline resulted in demands for AIG to post additional collateral to support the CDS. 13 Goldman Sachs, which held $20 billion in AIG CDS, demanded $1.5 billion in collateral in August 2007.14 AIG argued that this amount of collateral was excessive, so the parties compromised and AIG posted $450 million to Goldman in collateral.
1 5 Goldman asked for additional collateral in October, resulting in another $1.5 billion posting. 16 With the additional exposure from the market, AIG began to write down their CDS, which led to other holders of AIG CDS making collateral calls. 17 In February 2008, AIG announced a $5.3 billion quarterly loss, driven primarily by writing down CDS. 18 In May 2008, AIG announced another $7.8 billion quarterly loss again fueled by CDS write-downs.
19 By
July 31, 2008, AIG had posted more than $16.5 billion in collateral for CDS.
20
AIG's financial problems reached true crisis proportions in September 2008. Several things happened nearly simultaneously. On the news of the continuing write-offs combined with a worsening market, rating agencies "slashed" AIG's credit rating.
2 1 As a result, AIG was required to post another $14 to $20 billion in collateral for CDS. 22 But it was virtually impossible for AIG to raise this capital. It had already raised some $24 billion in collateral in the previous months, 23 so it had exhausted ready sources for capital. At about the same time, the bond markets "froze" on the news that Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy.
2 4 In addition, AIG's ability to raise capital in the equities market was undermined by a precipitous drop in its share price from more than $70 per share to a fifty-two week low of $1.25.25 AIG was poised for bankruptcy. Rather than risk the impact this would have on the world financial markets, 26 VILLANOVA ILAW REVIEW ment stepped in with an initial $85 billion loan, 27 which was shortly thereafter increased to $123 billion, 28 and then to $150 billion.
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AIG's collapse was not an insurance problem. The entity responsible for AIG's CDS business, AIG Financial Products Corp., was not an insurance company. 30 Sales of CDS were not subject to insurance regulation.
3 1
As derivatives, CDS were covered by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,32 which allowed for speculation in CDS 3 3 and was one reason for the market's exceptional growth. 34 AIG's insurance businesses were capitalized as separate entities and maintained appropriate reserves for the insurance claims. Even though CDS are not subject to insurance regulation, some have argued that CDS had the essential features of insurance.
3 6 This argument is based on the risk-transfer aspect of CDS. Because the seller of the CDS takes on the risk of a credit default, the buying party has "insurance" in the ordinary sense of the word against a default. 
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Credit default swaps have been described in the following way: A credit default swap is a contract, in which one party pays a "premium" over a set time period to the other party in exchange for the other party's promise that it will pay the buyer in the event that a credit event, like a default on a loan or a credit rating downgrade, occurs.
fundamentally is not insurance." These sorts of risk transfers are all around us. A money-back guaranty, for example, transfers the risk of dissatisfaction from the consumer to the retailer. A disclaimer that a garage operator is not responsible for damage to a parked car transfers risk from the operator to the car owner. The limitation on liability for credit card fraud to a specified amount transfers risk from the cardholder to the issuer. None of these risk transfers are insurance.
9
What makes insurance different from these other transactions is that insurance both transfers and distributes or pools a risk. 40 The classic example is fire insurance. The risk is transferred from the owner to the insurer, and then because the insurer issues thousands of policies to similarly situated owners, the risk is distributed or pooled. Each individual home only has a small probability of burning down. By each owner contributing a relatively small amount to the pool, when one house out of the thousands in the pool actually does burn down, there are sufficient resources (reserves) in the pool to pay to rebuild the insured house.
CDS do not have this pooling dimension. They are unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives. 41 Each transaction is individually negotiated and may or may not result in pooling. 42 While a specific issuer like AIG might choose to issue CDS on multiple credit risks and thereby achieve some level of pooling, that is not a necessary prerequisite of the product. In addition, as the experience with AIG shows, combining similar risks by selling many CDS actually increased the risk rather than distributing or pooling that risk. These risks are influenced by market changes, so that a drop in the bond market, for example, increases the risk of default (and collateral calls) for all CDS related to bonds, not just those of a particular bond issuer.
Instead of "pooling" a risk, CDS are used to "hedge" risks. A hedging device is one that counterbalances another risk in a portfolio. 43 Thus, for example, if an oil buyer is worried that the price of oil will increase, it may buy futures on oil that will lock in a certain price, transferring the risk of an increase to the seller of the futures contract. simple example would be the risk that oil prices would drop. By locking in the price for future oil sales, the seller has hedged against the risk of a price drop. Because the locked-in price will be above the current market price, but below the anticipated future price, the risk has been "balanced."
This balancing, of course, is often much more sophisticated than my example. In the case of CDS, the seller of the CDS might hedge against the default by buying stock (or stock options) of a competitor of the reference entity (the company issuing the debt instrument covered by the CDS). For example, if AIG has given CDS on bonds issued by General Motors, the risk of GM defaulting on its bonds could be offset by AIG buying options on Ford stock, which would increase in value in the event of a GM default. The problem was that AIG did not properly hedge its CDS risk. 4 4 Goldman Sachs, which held billions in debt instruments covered by AIG CDS, did a better job of hedging. When Goldman learned that AIG may have trouble providing the requested collateral, Goldman bought CDS on the risk that AIG would default. 45 Goldman's purchase of CDS on AIG illustrates another major difference between CDS and insurance-CDS are freely bought and sold. 46 Because CDS are a derivative instrument that is essentially unregulated, holders of the CDS could sell them to others. The buying and selling resulted in holders of CDS that did not have any other relationship to the underlying debt. This would not be allowed in the insurance world, where the holders of insurance must have an "insurable interest" in the thing being insured. 47 The sales of CDS can happen by either issuers or holders. While the resale of insurance policies is not specifically forbidden under insurance regulations, apart from sales of entire companies or divisions, such sales are contrary to the custom and practice of the industry because of the time and effort that goes into the underwriting process.
8
Once an insurer has made the investment to determine whether a risk should be insured, it is generally inclined to hold on to that risk (the policy), and it would be suspicious of any insurer trying to sell its insured risks to others. The obvious implication would be that the risk was worse than expected, so a buyer would be unlikely to buy it without a deep discount. 
C. Insurance Regulation Is Poorly Suited for CDS
These differences between CDS and insurance make the insurance regulatory model poorly suited to CDS regulation. Because insurance is a pooling mechanism, one of the primary objectives of regulation is to protect that pool so claims can be paid. This is done through financial solvency regulation. 49 As part of that regulation, insurers are to maintain capital sufficient to address the insurer's collective risks. 50 Unfortunately, insurers have nowhere near the amount of capital it would take to collectively stand behind CDS. Estimates of the total notional value for CDS peaked at around $60 trillion.
51 This is a gargantuan number, nearly four times the GDP of the United States. 52 Insurers obviously do not have enough capital to underwrite the full CDS market. Indeed, the total outstanding surplus for the property/casualty insurance industry in the United States at the end of 2008 was $455.6 billion. 55 Thus, the notional value of CDS was about 100 times the combined property/casualty surplus. A second reason that insurance regulation is not suitable for CDS is that it would not allow the market mechanism to function. As noted above, insurance regulation generally has an insurable interest requirement.
5 4 This requirement would interfere with the buying and selling of CDS because few secondary buyers would have an insurable interest in the underlying debt instrument. In addition, the insurable interest requirement would limit the use of CDS as a hedging mechanism. Buyers may want to use CDS to hedge against a counterbalancing risk even though they are not directly exposed to the risk covered by the CDS. This kind of access to a resale market also allows much broader access to capital because any investor in the market can take on the CDS risk (or for that matter, transfer the risk to someone else).
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fact that financial risk is substantially different than other kinds of risks covered by insurance. 5 5 Furthermore, insurance regulation, done in fifty different states, is slow and cumbersome compared to the speed at which things happen in the market.
II. THE STATE-BASED REGULATORY PARADIGM FOR INSURANCE
Although CDS are not insurance and AIG's collapse did not involve insurance, many are using the occasion to promote reform of insurance regulation. 56 The most commonly suggested reform is the adoption of an optional federal charter that would allow insurers to opt out of the state regulatory system. 5 7 Although support for the optional federal charter has grown in the wake of the AIG debacle, 5 8 a comprehensive and entrenched state regulatory system will not be easy to displace. Because so much of the financial regulatory system is federal, 5 9 most people naturally think about regulatory reform in terms of the federal system. Insurance, however, has developed a regulatory paradigm at the state level, which will be described in this section. We begin with a brief historical introduction, followed by a description of the scope and approach to state insurance regulation. The next subsection describes the development and functioning of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a sort of "trade group" for state insurance regulators that works to improve (and protect) the state insurance regulatory system. The final subsection considers the lessons to be learned from the state regulatory paradigm.
A. Historical Context: How Did We Come to the State Regulatory Paradigm?
Insurance regulation began at a time when the federal government was relatively weak and not significantly involved in the regulation of commerce. It is difficult to pinpoint a precise time when state insurance regulation began, but it was well underway before the Civil War. In the late 1700s and early 1800s, state regulation was done directly through the legislature or by putting conditions on corporate charters.
60 By the 1820s, some states were requiring insurers to report to a state official.
6 I In the 1850s, states began to give regulatory power to a board or a designated insurance official. 6 2 From the 1850s, state insurance regulation was "steadily extended and systematized." 
The U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Insurance Is Not Commerce
This early state regulation was insulated from federal interference in 1868 by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Virginia. 64 That case involved a challenge to a Virginia statute requiring insurance companies to post a bond as a condition of licensing, and making it illegal to sell insurance without a license. 6 5 A New York insurance agent was convicted under the statute for selling insurance policies of an insurer licensed in New York, but not Virginia. 66 The were not "citizens" entitled to protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 67 and that insurance was not commerce. The opinion states:
Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce. The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss by fire, entered into between the corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by the latter. These contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word.
68
This opinion was upheld and prevented federal regulation of insurance for some seventy-five years.
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In the period after Paul, the insurance industry experienced extreme boom and bust cycles. It took little capital to start up an insurance company, and because the obligation to pay was contingent and in the future, start-up insurers could generate significant revenue and profits by selling low-cost insurance. 70 Unfortunately, when catastrophic losses were incurred, as in the case of large-scale urban fires in the 1870s, many insurers were unable to pay policyholder claims and became insolvent.
7 1 One report in 1877 suggested that of the 4,000 insurance companies that had been started in the United States, only twenty-five percent, or 1,000 of them, remained. 
Insurers Respond by Reducing Competition
The bust part of the cycles encouraged insurers to find a way to avoid so many insolvencies. The initial answer was the creation of national insurance ratemaking boards, but competition led to regional compacts designed to set rates through local agents. The regional compacts prevented insolvencies, but also were anticompetitive. Anti-compact legislation was introduced in various states, but it either did not pass or was ineffective.
74 By the early 1900s, states began to introduce insurance rate regulation. 75 This regulation was relatively ineffective. Thus, in 1944 fifteen states either had no control over insurance rates, or the unsophisticated anti-monopoly provisions which did not regulate rate making but rather sought to preserve competition. In the other thirty-
The weak regulatory environment combined with industry efforts to maintain solvency by reducing competition and increasing prices set the stage for reconsideration of the federal role for insurance regulation. Insurers became more comfortable with collusion, and increasingly took advantage of the lack of competition. Most states allowed the insurers to increase rates as requested.
7 7 Missouri, however, was an exception. 7 8 In the late 1930s, the Missouri Superintendent of Insurance refused to authorize the requested rate increases, and he was sued by some 139 insurers.
7 9 While the case was pending, the difference between the old and proposed new rates was collected and deposited with the court. 8 0 The
Superintendent, a member of the Kansas City political "machine," negotiated a compromise whereby the insurers received eighty percent of the deposited money, but the other twenty percent went to the state. 
The U.S. Supreme Court Permits Federal Regulation
In 1942, the Department of Justice investigations led to grand jury indictments for violations of the Sherman Act, conspiracy to fix insurance rates, and monopolization of trade fire insurance.
8 3 The South-Eastern Underwriters Association, a cooperative rating bureau, and its ninety-eight members selling insurance in six states were subject to the indictments. 8 4
The allegations were supported by evidence that the members of the association controlled ninety percent of the market, fixed premiums rates and commissions, and enforced participation in the arrangement by boycotts and other kinds of coercion and intimidation. been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of insurance." The dissent by Justice Jackson foreshadowed congressional reaction. Although he was sympathetic to the constitutional argument, 9 2 he criticized the majority opinion on practical grounds: "The Court's decision at the very least will require an extensive overhauling of state legislation relating to taxation and supervision. "9 In addition, the Court's decision gave Congress responsibility for regulating interstate insurance transactions, State officials were concerned that their entire regulatory structure, and a significant source of state revenue through premium taxes, was at risk.
6
Consensus between state regulators, who wanted to keep insurance regulation, and federal officials, who had no experience or expertise, quickly developed.
9 " The Act, hurriedly drafted, 9 8 is only 415 words long. The key provisions provide:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.
1 00
This preference for state law, however, did not on its own invalidate the Supreme Court's decision in South-Eastern Underwriters. The law created a three-year window of opportunity to provide additional insurance regulation. The Act provided that the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and regulation by the Federal Trade Commission, "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law."' 0 ' Thus, the states were left to provide the regulation that would displace and "reverse preempt" federal law.' 0 2 Although their motives were "undoubtedly mixed, combining in varying proportions the desire to improve the quality and scope of state regulation of insurance 94. See id. ("The recklessness of such a course is emphasized when we consider that Congress has not one line of legislation deliberately designed to take over responsibility for this important and complicated enterprise."). 
95.

B. State Insurance Regulation
State insurance regulation is done through a comprehensive administrative structure that goes well beyond rate regulation. All states have some form of an insurance commissioner or an office of insurance, which has administrative authority to issue rules and regulations.
0 5 Statutes and regulations combine to create a regulatory system that covers licensing of insurers, policy forms, prices, premium taxes, market conduct, and solvency.
Licensing of Insurers
State regulation of insurance begins with licensure of insurance companies. Although there are some exceptions for "surplus lines" of insurance that do not require state licensure,10 6 the vast majority of insurance sold in a state must be issued by insurers licensed in the state ("domestic" insurers) or by insurers authorized to do business in the state licensed elsewhere ("non-domestic admitted" insurers). 10 7 To obtain a license, an insurer must meet certain capital requirements,10 8 obtain approval of its officers and directors, its financial plan, its business plan, and provide an actuarial justification. 0 9 Insurance intermediaries are also subject to licensing and supervision." 0 A licensed insurer is subject to comprehensive supervisory authority of the state regulators."' State regulators have the authority to inspect the insurer's records," 2 issue subpoenas to review company documents, and compel testimony." 3 Insurers must submit quarterly and annual financial statements to the regulators,11 4 and insurers must meet capital or surplus requirements, or in some cases must provide a custodial account Control of the licensing also provides regulators with a system for administrative sanctions. Licenses may be revoked or suspended for violations of state insurance requirements, 1 1 7 including violation of market conduct regulations.' 1 8
Such sanctions are subject to an administrative adjudication procedure.'
19 If an insurer becomes insolvent or starts to get into financial trouble, the regulators can increase their supervision and, if necessary, intervene in the insurer's operations. 120 The regulatory patchwork created by state licensing requirements is one of the main justifications for the proposed optional federal charter for insurance. Large insurers that conduct business in multiple states would prefer to have a single federal regulator rather than being subject to this maze of state regulation, which can be inconsistent or conflicting at times. 
Approval of Policy Forms
State regulators also have the power to regulate the forms used for insurance policies.' 2 2 This power is reflected in statutes and regulations, and is exercised through administrative review and informational directives from the insurance department.12 3 Some states require that forms be approved prior to their use, but regulatory reforms in many states allow forms to be used once a specified time has passed (generally a matter of days) after the proposed form has been filed with the insurance department.
1 2 4 A few states are even more liberal, and allow the use of policy forms so long as it is filed within a certain period of time after the form is first used. 125 There are some exceptional circumstances in which form filing requirements do not apply. 
Prices
Regulation of insurance prices is one of the more controversial regulatory issues. States take a fairly broad range of approaches-from states that mandate prices to states that allow open competition with no price regulation.
12 7 Few states are at either extreme. Most states take a middleground approach that is similar to the regulation of policy forms. They allow rates to be changed by file-and-use or by use-and-file systems. Under these systems, the insurer does not have to obtain approval for rate changes before using them, but the state retains the authority to disapprove rates.
128
The public policy debate about the utility and appropriateness of price regulation is ongoing. Illinois is the one state that does not have rate regulation for personal lines of insurance, and its insurance commissioner reports favorable results.
129 California is often used as a counterexample. It has become more stringent in rate regulation in recent years through the initiative process that has required insurance rate reductions, and its proponents argue that those measures have been successful. 13 
Premium Taxes
Prices charged for insurance in the United States also include a premium tax imposed by the states. These taxes are an important source of revenue to the states, and are one of the key motivations for states to retain regulatory authority over insurance.
13 2 As with any taxing system, especially one that is more than 150 years old, 133 the system has become more complex over time. In addition to the methods used to calculate the taxes, 134 the system has developed a number of credits, deductions, and offsets.' 35 The system also has to address its interaction with related tax systems, such as corporate income or franchise taxes.' 3 6 As the tax system became more sophisticated, insurers and policyholders developed arrangements designed to reduce state insurance premium tax liability.'
37
One of the unique developments concerning premium taxes is the use of so-called retaliatory taxes.' 3 8 These are premium taxes meant to equalize the difference in premium taxes from state to state. When a domestic insurer is subject to a premium tax in another state, if that tax rate is higher than the domestic premium tax, the home state "retaliates" against the other state by charging a higher premium tax for those insurers from that state.' 3 9 This complex system has developed because of the differential taxes charged by states. The constitutionality of these retalia- See tory taxes generally has been upheld.1 40 It has also given rise to its own reporting and payment system. 14 1 Although the federal government does not impose premium taxes on U.S. insurers, 14 2 a federal excise tax applies to foreign insurers.
131.
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Market Conduct
State insurance regulators have comprehensive power over insurers' market conduct, which is broad enough to include conduct with both consumers and competitors. Shortly after the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the NAIC prepared and approved a model unfair trade practices act.1 44 All states have adopted some version of the model act.' 45 These acts are considered remedial in nature and are broadly construed.1 46 Regulators have the power to undertake market conduct examinations of insurers.1 47 These market conduct examinations generally focus on sales, advertising, ratings, and the handling of claims.'
48 State regulators also have the authority to review books and records as part of their investigatory powers.
149
The definitions of unfair trade practices are broad enough to cover a wide variety of insurer activity.' 50 146. Unfair claims practices include misrepresentations of facts or policy provisions, failing to promptly acknowledge and communicate regarding a claim, failure to conduct a reasonable investigation, trying to settle without a complete statement of the coverage, unreasonable or improper delays, and unreasonable settlement offers, among others. Although the power to regulate in this area is comprehensive, the remedies are somewhat limited. As a general matter, penalties for violation are limited to cease and desist orders, suspension or revocation of licenses, or fines.
16 8 In addition, most administrative actions are limited to cases where the prohibited conduct is so common or regularly used as to amount to a business practice. State regulators "generally lack direct authority to intervene in specific cases." 169 In some states, the statutes for 
C. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
This comprehensive regulatory framework has given rise to an important quasi-governmental insurance organization, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). This organization is "quasi-governmental" because its members are state insurance commissioners, who are government officials, but the association itself is self described as a "voluntary organization" The NAIC is playing a facilitating role that might be similar to a central federal agency. It creates model laws and regulations, prepares standardized forms, coordinates financial examinations, maintains extensive national databases to assist in monitoring insurers, trains many state regulators, and prepares statistical reports.' 8 7 The NAIC performs these tasks strictly from the state regulatory paradigm. Professor Randall, in her study of the NAIC, found "a recurring pattern of regulatory behavior: a crisis precipitates threatened federal intervention, and in response to such threats, the NAIC, working with the industry, proposes, but only partially accomplishes, a program of centralized reform."' A year later, the NAIC's draft legislation was passed by both the House and ance Office has gained momentum, 2 0 1 the NAIC recently obtained concessions to the proposal to protect state regulation. 202 To the extent that other reform measures intend to include insurance, passing such measures will require overcoming or addressing the NAIC. The second lesson to be learned is that the state regulatory system is comprehensive and robust. It would be folly to act as if there is little or no regulation of insurance. Moreover, because state regulation of insurance has more than 100 years of history, valuable lessons have been learned that should be considered in connection with reform efforts. 20 3 While state regulation certainly has some limitations, it provides a comprehensive framework and regulatory apparatus with extensive experience and expertise. Reform of insurance regulation needs to take this into account.
III. STATE JUDICIAL REGULATION OF INSURANCE
In addition to state administrative regulation, insurance law includes a considerable regulation through state common law. Although most people who study regulation might not consider the common law as a source of regulation, that would be a mistake in the case of insurance. Indeed, in some respects the common law regulation of insurance through the courts may be more important than administrative regulation. 204 204. As will be discussed more fully below, the benefit of the common law remedies is that they are available to every consumer. While every consumer also can make an administrative complaint, after making the complaint the consumer has no influence or control over the matter. Moreover, the administrative remedies generally do not provide any specific relief for individual insureds. 
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insurance has created a remedy when insurers act in bad faith. My suggestion is that as part of financial regulatory reform a similar consumer remedy should be considered.
A. Insurers Are Liable for Acting in Bad Faith
One major common law doctrine that allows state judicial regulation of insurance is the doctrine of "bad faith." 20 6 This doctrine makes insurers liable for damages beyond those promised in the policy when their conduct amounts to bad faith. 20 7 The term "bad faith" is really a misnomer because the doctrine in its modern form has little to do with the insurer's state of mind. 208 Instead, it is a shorthand way of referring to conduct which gives rise to extracontractual damages. 20 9 Bad faith conduct is generally regarded as a tort and therefore gives rise to somewhat more generous tort remedies, including any foreseeable losses, emotional distress, 21 0 and in some cases, punitive damages. 21 ' The doctrine of bad faith in insurance law arose out of cases involving third-party liability insurance whereby an insurer has agreed to defend and indemnify the insured for certain claims.
2 12 Liability insurance is generally subject to policy limits for the amount that the insurer will pay under the policy. When an insurer is defending its insured against a thirdparty claim, the insurer also has a duty to respond to settlement offers. A common tactic for claimants is to offer to settle for policy limits. From a straight contract standpoint the insurer has little reason to accept such a settlement offer because it represents the insurer's maximum exposure in the case. 1113, 1114 (1990) . 214. The one exception to this would be where the liability seems clear and the defense's costs, which in general are not subject to policy limits, will be substantial. In such a case the insurer may accept a policy-limits settlement to avoid incurring substantial defense costs. While this defense-costs scenario will sometimes occur, a more likely scenario is where the insured has a possible defense in the case. When there is a possible defense, taking the case to trial holds out the possibility of a lesser verdict, or even a defense verdict. In such a scenario, there is little incentive for the insurer to accept a policy-limits settlement. See ASHLEY, Supra note 206, § 2:02.
The problem with this approach is that it undervalues the interest of the insured. From the insured's standpoint, a settlement offer within the policy limits avoids any individual liability for the insured. This is a significant benefit, especially when the insured is facing exposure beyond the policy limits.
2 15 An insurer, who is controlling the defense, has little incentive under the contract to accept the policy limits settlement, but the insured has a strong interest in accepting such an offer.
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The courts responded to this scenario by creating a liability rule for insurers under certain circumstances. The courts have found that each insurance policy includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that this covenant provides the basis for a tort claim for its violation.
2 17 It has been somewhat difficult for the courts to decide exactly what conduct amounts to "bad faith" in the settlement scenario. One view is that the insurer has an obligation to balance its interests with those of the insured, and if in rejecting the settlement the insurer fails to sufficiently protect that insured's interest, it is liable for bad faith. 218 Another view is that the insurer only has to accept reasonable settlements. If the settlement is unreasonable, then the insurer's rejection of it is not in bad faith.
2 19 A commonly accepted, but not universal, method for evaluating the reasonableness of the settlement is to consider whether an insurer would accept such an offer if there were no policy limits. 220 While the bad faith doctrine developed in the context of third-party insurance, it moved fairly quickly into the realm of first-party insurance.
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twenty percent for the first $1,500, and ten percent of the remainder, plus a reasonable attorney's fee. Experience with insurance bad faith law suggests that those involved in financial services regulatory reform might want to consider a similar kind of remedy. In particular, what I am suggesting is a private right of action that would allow consumers to use the courts to get relief from improper actions by financial institutions.
The primary benefit of this approach is to enlist the enforcement assistance of consumers nationwide. Regardless of the staffing and funding for a regulatory agency, it will always have limited enforcement resources. In the case of insurance regulation, the enforcement resources are typically an office with a modest staff in the department of insurance. It is somewhat difficult to get exact numbers, but in Missouri, the Department of Insurance, which was recently merged into a Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional Registration, 22 5 had 534 full-time employees in 2008.226 Only a relatively small percentage of this staff handles consumer complaints. The organization chart for the Missouri department showed only three out of forty-eight people as directly involved in consumer complaints. 22 7 The department received some 26,000 complaint phone calls in 2008, and handled 3,812 formal complaints. 22 8 Those are not insignificant numbers, but they are relatively small considering the millions of insureds in Missouri.
California, the largest state, may have the largest insurance department, but it also faces limited resources. In 2008, it had only 106 full-time staff working on consumer complaints. 229 That is only eight percent of the 1,336 staff that are authorized by law, 230 presumably because of budget difficulties faced by the state and the department. A staff of 106 can only handle a limited number of claims. The annual complaint report for auto insurance, for example, shows a total of 384 justified complaints in 2008 on more than twenty-two million insurance policies. 227. See id. at 15. This is about six percent of the management staff. Using that percentage as a basis for estimating the total staff for consumer complaints, the full-time employees working on consumer complaints would be about thirtythree. 
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See California Department of Insurance, Consumers: Auto Complaint Composite Page, http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0100-consumers/0040-studies-of action for insurer "bad faith" conduct may suggest a model for creating private rights of action for other financial services consumers. My goal has not been to present a specific proposal, but rather to present a different perspective-one that gives greater weight and consideration to states for both administrative and judicial regulation. 
